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1 Plants have a primitive perceptual Umwelt (e.g., Blancaflor 2012), but not a cognitive
Umwelt.
Robots on Spaceship Earth: 
A Theoretical Plea 
for Machine Metaphors
Koen B. Tanghe
It is astonishing what a different result 
one gets by changing the metaphor!
George Eliot (1860: 80)
Introduction: Nature and the human Umwelt
Jakob von Uexküll, a pioneer of biosemiotics and ethology, in the early
twentieth century gave a new meaning to the nineteenth-century term
Umwelt (Sutrop 2001): the world as experienced by a specific species. The
frequency of citation of Uexküll’s concept in semiotics is growing rapidly
(Kull 1998). I believe that it can also be useful in philosophy and in par-
ticular in a philosophical reconsideration of nature. The Umwelt of a par-
ticular species must for starters be contrasted with the unknowable world
as it is (the noumenon in the classic two-worlds interpretation of Kant’s
transcendental idealism). A distinction can furthermore be made between
the perceptual (representation) and the cognitive (understanding) Umwelt1.
Lastly, Uexküll was not a Darwinist, but an Umwelt normally fits an ani-
mal’s particular ecological niche, i.e., its way of life in a specific habitat,
as neatly as morphological features. Old World monkeys, for example, rely
on their trichromatic color vision to detect fruit against a background of
leaves. Flies are highly dependent on their capacity to process almost
seven times more visual information per second than humans to evade
predators (and newspapers and more traditional flyswatters). Serious mis-
matches between Umwelten and niches can therefore be as fatal as grave
Rethinking “Nature”
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mismatches between morphological features and niches. Also, a change of
niche will often be accompanied or facilitated by a change of Umwelt.
Nature is «perhaps the most complex word in the language» (Williams
1983: 219). One of the causes of the confusion may be that we normally
don’t make a clear distinction between nature as it is and our representa-
tion and understanding of nature. When we use the term to refer to “every-
thing there is” (“universal nature”, Castree 2001), we often mean to say
“everything there is as perceived and understood by us” (i.e., our Umwelt).
Our “nature” certainly differs profoundly from the “nature” of our me-
dieval ancestors. The term “nature” can also refer to “wildlife or things
and places on Earth which more or less persist in a natural state, undis-
turbed by man and his culture” (“external nature”) or “an essential quality
or inherent force of something, as in human nature versus nurture” (“in-
trinsic nature”). The false dichotomy between nature and nurture has been
deconstructed, although it will probably never disappear (e.g., Pinker
2004). The same is the case for the dichotomy between nature and
man/culture (Gray 2002 criticizes it; for a defense, see, e.g., Moriarty
2007). «Man is a part of Nature», Russell (1925: 1) wrote, «not something
contrasted with Nature». James Lovelock called us mechanically ad-
vanced beavers. We are indeed a very “transformative” part of nature.
Morton (2011) even compares human intelligence with plate tectonics or
photosynthesis. The real question, in any case, is not whether we, includ-
ing our culture, are a part of nature, but how we should conceptualize and
interpret “nature”. Whereas many believe that we should return to a more
intuitive and organic conceptualization, I here argue the opposite.
My point of departure is the “natural” human Umwelt (section 1). The
industrial-technological way of life of modern man has been facilitated by
a transition to an Umwelt that is to some extent characterized by a mecha-
nistic (as opposed to teleological and agential) understanding of nature
and by the use of machine metaphors (section 2). This transition is far
from complete and universal, though: modern, Western or westernized man
lives in or with a complex and hybrid, semi-scientific Umwelt. It is in par-
ticular still permeated by powerful religious or quasi-religious concepts
and metaphors, many of which are remnants of premodern Umwelten. They
are one of the causes of a mismatch between our modern niche and our
Umwelt (section 3). It is a purely theoretical and hopelessly utopian plea,
but it will be argued that the replacement of these archaic concepts and
metaphors with machine metaphors would result in a better match between
our Umwelt and niche (conclusion). 
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1. Two core features of “natural” human Umwelten
The attempt to identify features that meaningfully distinguish man from
other animals has been disappointingly futile. Famous, in this respect, is
Diogenes’ of Sinope anecdotal reaction to Plato’s definition of man (“a
bipedal living being without feathers”): he plucked all of the feathers from a
rooster and delivered it to Plato, upon which Plato had to add yet another
qualification – “with flat toenails”. Many centuries later, Goethe was exhila-
rated by his discovery of the supposedly non-existing human os intermaxil-
lare (he did not realize that he had been preceded by Félix Vick d’Azyr). It
is, in this light, quite ironic that the application of the original Umwelt con-
cept to man has proven to be somewhat controversial, since nothing distin-
guishes us from other animals more clearly than our “rich” and “deep” cog-
nitive Umwelt (e.g., Landmann 1966: 163-174). I will here focus on only two
correlated features of “natural” human Umwelten: language and religion.
Language is «a means for sorting and manipulating the plethora of in-
formation that deluges us throughout our waking life» (Bickerton 1990: 5).
Our concepts indeed to some extent structure our perception and behavior
(linguistic determinism). Most originate as metaphors: the nineteenth-cen-
tury German writer Jean Paul aptly called language «a dictionary of
bleached metaphors». Metaphors are ubiquitous and influential ingredi-
ents of languages and therefore, ipso facto, crucial constituents of human
Umwelten. Not only do we use, on average, six metaphors per seventeen
words, they also provide «the only ways to perceive and experience much
of the world» (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 239). They structure our percep-
tion, thought and behavior, often without us realizing it. Thibodeau and
Boroditsky (2011), for example, have shown that people are most likely to
call for strong law enforcement when a crime is presented as a beast and
that they are more prone to accepting solutions such as rehabilitation
when it is presented as a virus. The participants in this study were com-
pletely unaware that these two metaphors determined their decision. They
believed instead that their choice was inspired by objective parameters.
George Eliot (1860: 80) wondered why «we can so seldom declare what a
thing is, except by saying it is something else?». Even the practice of sci-
ence and philosophy is a «war of metaphors» (Dennett 1991: 455). We are
in particular inclined to try to understand new or more abstract domains
through «our experiences with the physical world» (Kövecses 2010: 7). Or,
as Brown (2003: 184) puts it: «Presented with new aspects of the world, we
humans understand them in terms of deeply ingrained bodily and social
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experiences that already form the framework for dealing with life on a day-
to-day basis». A possible explanation for this striking cognitive inclination is
that neural circuits that steer our motor, sensory and social functioning were
given a new, linguistic task when we evolved to process abstract thoughts.
This brings us to a second important feature of human Umwelten: they
are or tend to be highly agential, i.e., nature tends to be interpreted in terms
of agential metaphors such as ancestors, gods, witches, devils, angels, and
so forth. Boyer (1994) points out that a belief in non-physical beings is the
defining feature of religions. Likewise, Mithen (1996: 175-176) states that,
since the classic work of E.B. Tylor (1871), the idea of non-physical beings
has «been taken for the very definition of religion itself». Even death was
personified (Thanatos, Dullahan, Azrael, Michael, and so forth). Modern
hunter-gatherers all think about the natural world as if it were imbued with
will and purpose (e.g., Mithen 1996: 47-48). Nature was and to a certain ex-
tent remains identified or at least associated with these agential metaphors:
religious people do not realize that they are using metaphors.
This agential or religious nature of our “natural” Umwelt seems, like
the evolution of language itself, to be directly linked to the main factor be-
hind the evolution of the brain, the organ that generates our Umwelt. Ac-
cording to the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar 1993, 2009; Dávid-Barrett
and Dunbar 2013), our neocortex primarily evolved as an adaptation to a
more complex social environment (Kapogiannis et al. 2009 found tentative
evidence for the thesis that religions are productions of the social brain).
The question is not whether this was an important factor behind the evolu-
tion of our brain and our cognitive Umwelt, but rather whether it was the
main factor. Mithen (1996), for example, identifies three cognitive domains
or intelligences: the social, the technical and the natural history domain,
with each being constituted by a bundle of interacting mental modules.
However, even in Mithen’s theory, the social domain stands central.
We developed a sophisticated theory of mind: the automatic tendency to
attribute mental states such as beliefs, intentions and goals to others and
the ability to imagine these mental states and thus to understand, mimic
and manipulate other people (e.g., Schlinger 2009). Three-year-old chil-
dren already appear to understand that other people have goals and beliefs
that determine their behavior (Wellman 1990). This kind of agential think-
ing is, from a very early age, extended to the biological and even the non-
biological world. Deborah Kelemen (2004: 295) succinctly speaks of
«promiscuous teleology». At a certain point in time, we apparently began
to use our social brain or the social domain to think about non-human
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nature, instead of only about other human beings. According to Mithen,
this “overflowing” of the social domain into the natural world started when
we began to use language as a means for communicating abstract thought.
Thanks to modern language, knowledge that had previously been trapped
in separate domains and of which we were hardly conscious at all (con-
sciousness was largely limited to the social sphere) was pulled into the so-
cial domain and became the subject of conscious thought and creativity:
cognition became fluid. The result was, 100,000 to 30,000 years ago, a
cultural explosion, including the birth of religions. 
Mithen was inspired by Dunbar (1996) who also associated the evolu-
tion of abstract language with complex symbolic culture, including rituals
and religions. The original evolutionary function of language, however, was
to allow social bonding between groups of hominids, once they became too
large for bonding through grooming (Dunbar 1993, 1996; see also Dávid-
Barrett and Dunbar 2013). Our modern linguistic behavior still betrays
that social origin: gossip forms an important part of daily life (Dunbar
1996). Modern languages also betray their social origin in that they are
permeated with agential metaphors and metaphorical expressions. Cogni-
tive psychologists call the inclination to endow the inanimate with ani-
mate, emotional or expressive qualities the physiognomic perception
(physiognomic projection is the property of addressing inanimate objects
as if they were living beings). Linguists have also long observed that we
tend to use the same concepts and structures whether talking about ani-
mate or inanimate entities: we talk about inanimate objects as if they were
living things. The sentence “the book fell off the shelf”, for example, is
equivalent in structure to the sentence “the man fell off the ladder”.
Even scientists can hardly avoid talking about animals, plants, cells or
molecules without somehow assuming that they are beings with goals and
intentions (e.g., selfish genes and chaperone molecules). Dennett (2011:
481) calls it the «power of the intentional stance». These agential
metaphors have the potential not only to mislead the public but also the
scientists themselves, even though they fully realize that such are only
metaphors. In 1869, Darwin admitted in a letter to Wallace that he had
been misled by his breeding analogy to assume that single variations would
be preserved in a population. Likewise, Dawkins (2006: ix) has conceded
that he has been misled by his selfish gene metaphor. Even the mere anal-
ogy with organisms can be misleading. Lovelock’s Gaia metaphor is a good
example. Biological processes influence abiotic processes but these biolog-
ical feedbacks do not, in contrast to what Lovelock claims, «generally 
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enhance the self-regulation of the atmosphere-biosphere system […]»
(Kirchner 2003: 22) in the same way that an organism regulates itself.
Likewise, Darwin began his evolutionary theorizing (1837-1839) with an
organism analogy (Hodge 1985): he compared extinctions with the death of
an organism (species senescence) and the coming into being of new species
with reproduction. The metaphor of society as an organism (MacLay 1990)
was the source of the highly influential idea of historical decline: if soci-
eties are like organisms, they must eventually face decline and death (Her-
man 1997: 106). Ecologists are influenced unknowingly by the popular
metaphor of the ecosystem as a community (Silver 2006: 219-221).
2. The partial mechanization of our Umwelt
The rise of the scientific method has in large measure depended on hu-
man thinkers «disciplining themselves to abjure transactional, sociomagi-
cal styles of reasoning» (Humphrey 1976: 315). Thinking in terms of be-
ings and goals was increasingly replaced with mechanistic and ateleologi-
cal thinking. «This anti-teleological line of thought reaches its climax in
the Darwinian theory of the nineteenth century, which seeks to explain or-
ganic forms causally and mechanically, without any appeal to vital force or
purpose of any kind in the things or outside of them» (Thilly 1965: 269,
see also Dennett 1995 and Inkpen forthcoming). This disciplining, in my
opinion, also marks the true birth of the modern dichotomy between nature
and man (Collingwood 1945, Merchant 1980, Callicott 1992): it came into
being when we stopped interpreting nature in human (social, agential and
teleological) terms. Our resulting alienation from nature has been an im-
portant philosophical theme and challenge ever since. Countless thinkers,
from Hegel to Teilhard de Chardin and Whitehead, have tried to rethink
nature in more human, agential, teleological or ensouled terms.
The Greeks were among the first to coin a specific term for non-human
phenomena (Macnaghten and Urry 1998), but even they still conceived
this natural world as permeated by mind and telos. It was «a rational ani-
mal with a mind of its own» (Collingwood 1945: 3). By contrast, Francis
Bacon compared final causes to the Vestal virgins who served at Roman
temples. Like them, he said, they are dedicated to God and are barren. «If
we trace the history of the progress of the human mind», Laplace wrote
in his Exposition (1796), «and of its errors, we shall observe final causes
perpetually receding, according as the boundaries of our knowledge are
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extended» (quoted in Greene 1973: 37). Shanks (2004: 30) puts it thus:
Surveying these events, it is fair to say that correlative with the rise of modern
science is the dual phenomenon of nature being conceptualized with the aid of
mechanical metaphors and nature being studied with the aid of machines (tele-
scopes, microscopes, barometers, vacuum pumps, and so on).
Biology in particular, has, since the seventeenth century, been a work-
ing out of «Descarte’s [sic] original metaphor of the organism as machine»
(Lewontin 2001: 1263). This mechanization wasn’t inspired by religious
doubts, nor did it lead immediately to such doubts. On the contrary, the
design argument for the existence of God was rather bolstered by the rise
of modern science. Indeed, some modern scholars (e.g., Pigliucci and
Boudry 2011) even argue against the use of machine metaphors because of
their misuse by creationists. However, the ultimate Christian agent was,
nevertheless, relegated to the role of original designer of nature. The “me-
chanick theists”, as they were called,
attempted to weld into a single philosophy of nature two not entirely compati-
ble conceptions: one, the idea of nature as a law-bound system of matter and mo-
tion, and two, the idea of nature as a habitation created for the use and edifica-
tion of intelligent beings by an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God
(Greene 1973: 12).
Newton opposed the autonomous clockwork universe (in his universe,
God still intervened) and the eager use, by scholars, of his mechanical
laws of motion to spin theories of the origin of the Earth and the solar sys-
tem, but to no avail: the natural theologists ended «by eliminating God
from His works and overthrowing the chief argument for His existence:
namely, the wise adaptation of the present frame of nature to the need of
living creatures, especially man» (ibid.: 13).
The scientific revolution «outshines everything since the rise of Chris-
tianity» (Butterfield 1949: vii) and «looms so large as the real origin both
of the modern world and of the modern mentality that our customary peri-
odization of European history has become an anachronism and an encum-
brance» (ibid.: viii). I believe that modern science outshines everything
since at least the Neolithic Revolution. It radically transformed and still is
transforming our Umwelt2. In a couple of centuries, we made more
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progress toward a better understanding of nature than during the 3.6 bil-
lion years that preceded this revolution. It facilitated, together with the as-
sociated belief in progress (Bury 1920), the transition to our modern in-
dustrial-technological niche, i.e., the industrial-technological exploitation
and modification of Earth (Jacob 2006, Spadafora 1990), resulting in a
budding anthropogenic biosphere (e.g., Ellis 2011a)3. It is well-known that
our hunter-gatherer bodies are not very well adapted to that new niche,
leading to what Lieberman (2013) calls “mismatch diseases”. I believe
that the same can be said of our hunter-gatherer brain and that this has re-
sulted in a “mismatch Umwelt”.
3. The mismatch with our modern niche
Animals often manipulate and alter their habitat or elements of their
habitat in order to satisfy their needs and the needs of their offspring, a
phenomenon that is still underestimated and underresearched (Odling-
Smee, Laland and Feldman 2003). This niche alteration and construction
introduces feedback into the evolutionary dynamic. It significantly modi-
fies the selection pressures acting on both the species themselves and on
other species. Homo sapiens can be defined as an omnivore, specialized in
niche construction, i.e., in meeting his needs by altering and manipulating
his habitat and thus also in steering his own evolution and that of other
species. The transition from an existence as largely vegetarian tree dweller
to one as scavenger, hunter and gatherer was already facilitated by the use
of tools. This niche construction in turn steered human evolution. Throw-
ing rocks and swinging clubs at adversaries, for example, led to extensive
anatomical remodeling of the human hand: the two modern handgrips, the
“precision grip” and “power grip”, represent a throwing grip and a club-
bing grip (Young 2003). Other examples of cultural inventions that steered
human evolution are spears (Roach et al. 2013), cooking (Wrangham
2009) and, possibly, agriculture (Cochran and Harpending 2009).
The agricultural exploitation of our habitats certainly had a noticeable
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impact on the planet. Humans now «truly began to harness the earth. […]
farmers utilize the landscape intensively and create a milieu that suits
their needs» (Price and Bar-Yosef 2011: S171). Ruddiman (2005) calls
farming the largest alteration of the Earth’s surface from its natural state
that humans have yet achieved. Even the New World, including the Ama-
zonian rain forest, was, by 1492, largely anthropogenic (Mann 2005). The
Neolithic Revolution also marks the start of man’s alteration of the Earth’s
climate (e.g., Pongratz and Caldeira 2012). Our farming ancestors may
thus have averted or helped avert the onset of a new ice age (Ruddiman
2005) or even a semi-permanent ice age (Crowley and Hyde 2008).
In the mean time, the human impact on the atmo-, bio-, hydro- (liquid
water), cryo- (the ice sheets and glaciers) and geosphere has become so
extensive that many scholars speak of a new age: the Anthropocene (Ellis
2011a, Zalasiewicz et al. 2011) (the Yupik-Inuit already referred to west-
erners as “the people who change nature”). Or, as Ellis (2011b) puts it:
«Forget Mother Nature: This is a World of Our Making». We are slowly but
steadily turning the entire planet into an anthropogenic habitat. We may,
eventually, even remake ourselves (Silver 1998). This is, whether one likes
it or not, our evolutionary destiny as the niche constructing species par ex-
cellence. However, «If humanity’s role has expanded to the point that the
entire Earth is our niche, the trend of the changes we have made lately in-
dicates that we are doing a poor job of niche maintenance» (Brand 2010:
275). I am afraid that our Umwelt is unsuited for our new niche in more
than one way. However, I will here focus on mainly one mismatch.
Environmental theorists like Merchant (1980) of course argue that we
used to treat nature better back in the days when everybody exclusively
thought of it in organismic and agential terms. Suggestions that we should
return to such a conceptualization of nature (Callicott 1992, Goldsmith
1992) and “reenchant” our mechanized world (Berman 1981), originate in
eighteenth-century Romanticism (Herman 1997). For the Naturphiloso -
phen, for example, the world was, once again, an enchanted and ensouled
being [anima mundi], not a machine (for a history of this idea, see Bonifazi
1978), one of which human beings were or should be a part (hence
Goethe’s joy in finding the human os intermaxillare). Likewise, McKibben,
in his influential bestseller The End of Nature (1989), laments the disap-
pearance of nature as a separate, undisturbed entity and abhors the idea of
a managed, anthropogenic planet. It is clear that he worships nature as if it
were some kind of sacred being or a creation by a sacred being. Rain, for
instance, loses its special, sacred power once it bears the permanent stamp
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of modern man. «Instead of being a category like God – something beyond
our control – it is now a category like the defense budget or the minimum
wage, a problem we must work out» (McKibben 1989: 229). He also
speaks of the lack of “reverence” for genetically engineered rabbits (ibid.:
230), trout (ibid.: 232) and plants (ibid.: 175). The end of nature may, «for
those of us who have tended to locate God in nature» (ibid.: 85), even have
the same, faith-shattering effects as the Holocaust. However, the scientific
evidence seems, as we saw, to contradict the Romantic idea of a pristine
premodern world: the Anthropocene started 10,000 years ago.
We should indeed forget Mother Nature, that projection of our social
brain, and accept the anthropogenic reality. Seen this way, it is precisely the
ancient, agential way of thinking about nature that Merchant et al. defend
that is problematic. It continues to exert a certain influence on modern soci-
eties and is holding us back at a time at which we should be making rapid
progress. It in particular contributes to the impediment of progress in two
important domains: biotechnology (especially genetic engineering) and geo-
engineering. Both are of crucial importance in the further construction of
the anthropogenic habitat. In Terraforming Earth: Geoengineering Megaplan
Starts Now (2013), Michael Marschal argues that we should immediately re-
search various geoengineering techniques because we are running out of
time. In reality, hardly any sizeable research at all has been done. Geoengi-
neering was until very recently a taboo, even among scientists. The public is
open to the idea of researching geoengineering, «while holding significant
reservations about ever deploying it» (Corner et al. 2013: 941). The opposi-
tion against certain biotechnological developments and in particular geneti-
cally manipulated crops is also well-known (e.g., Silver 2006). There are
several reasons for this resistance, but an important cause is that these tech-
nologies are deemed a “blasphemous” violation of nature. Williams (2002:
5) speaks of a «deeply rooted myth in the Western psyche and its culture
that nature is a passive, harmonious, God-given backdrop against which the
drama of human life is played out». Interfering with this God-given or God-
like natural order is taboo and dangerous, as evidenced by countless sci-
ence fiction stories and movies (Schelde 1993), ranging from Shelley’s
Frankenstein (1818) to The Rise of the Planet of the Apes (2011).
The aforementioned «two not entirely compatible conceptions» of na-
ture, the agential and the mechanistic conception, are clearly still with us
today. Many in the West fear that biotechnology will «violate an unseen
entity […]» (Silver 2006: xi). For those on the right, it is the God of the
Bible, those on the left «have transferred their allegiance to a vague Mother
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Nature goddess here on earth – although they usually don’t verbalize their
feelings in such terms» (ibid.: xi). The reason why advocates of organic
food accept breeding techniques but not directed genetic engineering is
that they believe that «the methods of Mother Nature are sacred, and that
human modification of genes violates her spiritual integrity» (ibid.: 269).
Analyses of public discourses of, or ideas about, genetically modified food
(Shaw 2002, Hansen 2006) and geoengineering (Corner et al. 2013) reveal
the same fear: these technologies are, like nuclear energy (Weart 1988) or
nanotechnology (Scheufele et al. 2008), seen as unnatural and therefore
inappropriate and unethical. Nature is thereby often portrayed as a power-
ful Goddess who «will “hit back” at inappropriate human intervention»
(Shaw 2002: 281) or who “knows” she has a problem and will “cleanse”
herself of the human rash (Corner et al. 2013: 945).
Conclusion: a plea for machine metaphors
The “diagnosis” is clear: there is a clear mismatch between the Umwelt
of modern society and its industrial-technological niche in that the Umwelt
is replete with agential metaphors (or notions that can be interpreted as
such) that, as we have just seen, constitute an impediment to the further
construction of that niche. They prime people to oppose progress in impor-
tant domains: a holy and stable, God-like or God-given natural order may
not be interfered with. The “remedy” is, theoretically, very simple. These
agential metaphors should be abolished and, in some cases, replaced with
metaphors that better match the modern human niche, i.e., machine
metaphors, as machine-like entities can and should be tuned and
modified4. This radical replacement should start in childhood. Maynard
Smith (1984) believed that we need both science and myths, but that they
should be kept strictly apart. I beg to differ. Myths are one of the means
whereby the unconscious foundations of an Umwelt are laid. They there-
fore ought to be inspired by, and based on, science and machine
metaphors instead of being kept apart from science5.
Let me, again, emphasize that this is a purely theoretical plea: our social
07Tanghe 113_Layout 1  11/06/14  11:59  Pagina 123
6 It is of course highly ironic that it was one of the fathers of the modern, mechanistic inter-
pretation of the world, Descartes, who, with his strict dualism between mind and matter, cemented
this illusion in the modern mind. He thus also contributed to the modern separation between
man and nature.
124 Koen B. Tanghe
brain is, to a greater or lesser extent, addicted to an agential interpretation of
nature. A radical eradication of such an interpretation is therefore all but
impossible – much as we cannot improve the perceptual Umwelt of a partic-
ular species by enhancing one of its senses. Even scientists can, as we have
seen, and as the dubious success of the selfish gene metaphor illustrates, fall
under the spell of agential metaphors. However, I will, nevertheless, end this
analysis with a few words about a twin root metaphor that should or would
stand central in a fully “mechanized” human Umwelt: that we are self-con-
scious and highly sophisticated but far from perfect “robots”, living on board
a giant and wonderful but also potentially dangerous “spaceship”.
The modern depiction of the ancient machina mundi as a spaceship
dates from the nineteenth century. The metaphor became more prevalent,
once we began, in the 1950s, to build and launch spaceships and after the
first satellite photographs of Earth were released by NASA in the late
1960s. However, it remains somewhat marginal, certainly compared to the
Gaia metaphor. The real stumbling block, though, is its “twin”, the
metaphor that should occupy the central position in the sciences that study
man: de La Mettrie’s l’homme machine. Few oppose the idea that our body
resembles a machine; however, our conscious mind allegedly still belongs
to a sphere of its own. This may be the ultimate source of agential thinking:
the self-evident and deeply rooted assumption that “we” (our conscious
“I”), are, as agents, in control of “ourselves” (the human organism)6. Alas,
while we may be uniquely self-reflective animals, that does not mean that
“we” are in so meaningful a way in control as we tend and like to believe.
In that ambitious sense, free will is nothing but a classic, prescientific illu-
sion (e.g., Flanagan 2002), right up there with the illusion that the Earth is
flat, life and the universe static or time and space absolute. As has been the
case with previous illusions of knowledge, its scientific shattering will or
would have important repercussions (e.g., Verplaetse 2011). 
The so-called agency illusion is undoubtedly, like the belief in supernat-
ural agents, adaptive (e.g., Rakos 2004), i.e., it was adaptive in the niche in
which it evolved. One may wonder though, whether it is still as adaptive
now that we have acquired almost God-like powers, i.e., whether this belief
does not constitute another mismatch between our Umwelt and our niche.
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Brand (2010: 1) writes: «We are as gods and HAVE to get good at it» (see
also Lynas 2011). Ironically, if we truly were as gods, instead of self-con-
scious animals, if our conscious, rational “I” truly were in full control, we
would probably not have to get good at being like gods, i.e., we would not
be confronted with potentially apocalyptic problems like overpopulation
and climate change. In any case: we will indeed increasingly need to act as
gods or face the consequences of not acting. We should proceed very cau-
tiously in “taboo” domains such as genetic engineering and geoengineer-
ing, but proceed we should. In his latest book, Craig Venter (2013) writes
that he is not concerned with complaints about man playing God. His great-
est fear is not the abuse of technology but that we do not use it at all. In his
vision, synthetic organisms will heal the planet and extend humanity’s
reach beyond Earth. This may smack of classic techno-hubris; however, it
is indeed not exuberant techno-optimism that should be feared most, but
pessimism and immobilism, inspired by anxiety and agential eco-worship.
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Abstract
Metaphors are inevitable core elements of the conceptual schemes that
shape our thinking and behavior. Traditionally, nature is interpreted in
terms of agential metaphors such as ghosts, gods, witches and angels. Sci-
ence, in contrast, is characterized by contra-intuitive, mechanistic thinking
and machine metaphors. Modern societies nevertheless remain, to a certain
extent, in the grip of powerful agential tropes. It will be argued that they are
one of the obstacles that stand in the way of both reaping the full benefits of
modern science and of meeting two of the biggest challenges we have ever
faced: overpopulation and climate change. Or, put differrently, they are one
of the reasons why there is a problematic mismatch between our modern
“Umwelt” and “niche”.
07Tanghe 113_Layout 1  27/05/14  12:48  Pagina 130
Edizioni ETS
Piazza Carrara, 16-19, I-56126 Pisa
info@edizioniets.com - www.edizioniets.com
Finito di stampare nel mese di giugno 2014
11Monceri 183_Layout 1  30/05/14  09:07  Pagina 202
